Beyoncé Knowles is a veritable wealth of relationship knowledge and advice. She has mused about what she would do were she of the opposite gender, that men aren’t so irreplaceable, and, perhaps most pertinently, if you like it, then you should put a ring on it – it being her ring finger, for those of you in any form of doubt.
What Beyoncé doesn’t educate the uninformed about, is what to do if he does put a ring on it, and then it later turns pear shaped. Do you keep the ring, or give it back?
This question is at the heart of the dispute between New York residents Christopher Reinhold and Colette DiPierro.
Reinhold is claiming that a $17, 500 diamond engagement ring given to DiPierro was given ‘in contemplation and consideration of marriage’. DiPierro, four months after accepting the ring, broke off the engagement and now refuses to return the engagement ring. Reinhold is now seeking the return of the ring, or the cost of the ring, plus $5000 for fees and legal expenses. The plot thickens, however: DiPierro claims that the ring was not consideration for promise to marry, because it was given to her on her birthday, and therefore constitutes an unconditional gift.
What’s the Issue Here?
The heart of the claim lies in the assumption of a social norm that the giving of a diamond ring to a woman is considered to be a sign of commitment to marry – the term ‘engagement ring’ is reflective of this. The ring can thus be distinguished from the $17, 500 necklace or the sports car given to DiPeirro by Reinhold, which may be viewed as being a ‘token of affection’.
Assuming that the ring is not considered to be a birthday gift, the case will be governed by §80-b of the New York Civil Rights Law, which provides:
Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery of a chattel, the return of money or securities, or the value thereof at the time of such transfer, or the rescission of a deed to real property when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities or real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred, and the court may, if in its discretion justice so requires, (1) award the defendant a lien upon the chattel, securities or real property for monies expended in connection therewith or improvements made thereto, (2) deny judgment for the recovery of the chattel or securities or for rescission of the deed and award money damages in lieu thereof.
The statute, and associated case law (see Friedman v. Geller, 1975, 82 Misc2d 291) creates a strong, yet rebuttable presumption that where the sole consideration for transfer of a chattel, property or money was a contemplated marriage, the property is recoverable. Further, the Court of Appeal held that fault in the breakdown of a relationship was largely irrelevant in recovery proceedings in the case Gaden v Gaden. The purpose of §80-b was viewed as being to return the two parties to the position they were in prior to their becoming engaged, without rewarding or punishing either party for the fact the marriage had failed to materialise.
It should be noted that such a perspective on the nature and purpose of the remedy – attempting to place the parties in their original position – is usually associated more closely with Tort and unjust enrichment, rather than remedies in contract, which tend to focus on putting the parties where they would have been, had the contract been carried out. Obviously, the point of difference between a contract to marry, and other forms of (non-social) contract, is that it is incredibly difficult to determine what position the parties would have occupied in the event they had been married, and what benefits would have been derived as a result.
This perspective does not, by any means, reflect the law in other jurisdictions. The position in Virginia, typified by the case Jack A. Georgalas v. Kimberly Kilgore, is not to allow such claims. The reason for the prohibition on claims lies in §8.01-220 of the Virginia Code, which provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no civil action shall lie or be maintained in this Commonwealth for alienation of affection, breach of promise to marry, or criminal conversation upon which a cause of action arose or occurred on or after June 28, 1968.
B. No civil action for seduction shall lie or be maintained where the cause of action arose or accrued on or after July 1, 1974.
In the case of Georgalas, the Court read this provision in combination with the ruling in the case of Holmburg v. Ferrell, in which the plaintiff was denied the recovery of a vehicle, which was given on the condition that the defendant marry him. The court in Holmburg took the view that suits for breach of promise to marry are unenforceable on the grounds that they are contrary to public policy.
So What?
Such law suits are unlikely to completely disappear. The acrimonious circumstances of the breaking of an engagement, and the absence in some jurisdictions of a prohibition on suing for recovery on public policy grounds, will see the continued pursuit of legal action by disgruntled ex fiancés and jilted lovers. And it makes sense, too – now you’re not getting married, $17 500 seems like a lot of money to be spending on someone.
If only Beyoncé could hurry up and release her next single, ‘If you’re going to propose to your girlfriend, and you’re worried it might not work out and you want to get the ring back, make sure you don’t propose on her birthday – it’s tacky, and makes the ability to pursue recovery legally ambiguous’.
Yeah, that would be a hit for sure.
